Dealing With Mass Atrocities and Ethnic Violence:
Can Alternative Forms of Justice be Effective?
A Case Study of Rwanda
Philip J. Drew
2000
A problem common to all countries moving from [ethnic violence] to democratic rule is how to deal with the past, and in particular, how to deal
with former leaders and their collaborators responsible for past egregious human rights abuses....The solution must take into account both the nature
of that society's past illness as well as the present and future needs of such a society (1)
During the one hundred days that followed the assassination of their president on April 6, 1994, the inhabitants of tiny
African republic of Rwanda embarked on what some have described as the most vicious genocide that the world has ever
witnessed. In the period between early April and the middle of July, some 750,000 to 800,000 (2)
people, mainly of the
minority Tutsi tribe, were massacred by members of the Hutu majority (3)
The involvement of the general population in the
genocide was incredible. The killings were carried out with unspeakable cruelty; neighbours killed neighbours; Hutu
husbands killed their Tutsi wives and their families; roving gangs tortured and raped women then cut off their breasts
before killing them; people were burnt alive, thrown dead or alive into pit latrines or drowned in communal wells. Tutsis
were hunted all over the country. There were no safe havens. Some of the worst massacres were directed against people
seeking refuge in churches or seeking medical assistance in hospitals. Everyone seemed to join in the frenzy, including
police, priests, school teachers and bourgomeistres. (4)
As Gerard Prunier, one of the most accomplished authors on Rwanda
points out, "the daily killing rate was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps" of World war Two (5)
Some five years after the genocide ended, Rwanda continues to be haunted by its demons. In the years following the
genocide numerous attempts have been made to bring justice to the country, closure on its horrific past, and reconciliation
to its deeply divided people. Thus far, the programs implemented to bring about the rule of law and the healing of the
nation have been largely unsuccessful. This paper will review the efforts that have been made to establish the rule of law in Rwanda during the five years
following the genocide. It will outline the mechanisms that were instituted to deal with those responsible for visiting the
genocide upon the country, and discuss the effectiveness of those mechanisms in accomplishing dispute resolution and
national reconciliation. There will also be an examination of the Gacaca (a traditional African dispute resolution system)
as a possible tool to tackle the problem of dealing with those who had committed genocide and crimes against humanity on
one hand, and trying to achieve national reconciliation on the other. Background As with any society emerging from a brutal civil conflict, Rwanda has faced the daunting challenge of building peace,
stabilizing its security situation, reconciling its population and preventing a relapse into violence. (6)
Given the culture of
ethnic hatred and impunity that had been fostered in the country during the years following the termination of Belgian
colonial rule in 1959, and the deep wounds caused by the genocide itself, this task has proven to be exceptionally difficult. Following the genocide Rwanda's justice system was left in disarray. There was no police force left in the country. Many
of the country's police had taken part in the massacres; fearing reprisals from the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Army, they
had scrambled away to take refuge in neighbouring countries. Those who had not fled were looked upon with suspicion by
the new government (7)
As Marc Cousineau points out, "Le système judiciaire a été [aussi] paralysé par le génocide et la
guerre. Des 750 magistrats en fonction en mars 1994, seuls 256 ont survécu aux massacres, dont seize seulement sont
juristes. (8)
Most of the court houses in the country were left in ruins and the jails had been ransacked. In essence, the new
government was faced with building a justice system from the ground up, attempting to construct new foundations
grounded in the rule of law. Breaking the Culture of Impunity L'histoire du Rwanda depuis son indépendance de la Belgique atteste la réalité du postulat voulant que celui ou celle qui choisit de ne pas respecter
les principes de l'État de droit choisit simultanément de privilégier l'oppression et le sang. De 1962, date de son indépendance, jusqu'à la victoire du
Front patriotique rwandais en juillet 1994, le peuple rwandais a été victime de massacres, de génocides, et de violations systémiques des droits de la
personne, et, de façon générale, de tous les effets pernicieux de l'exercice d'un pouvoir arbitraire et absolu exercé par un régime qui échappait au
contrôle judiciaire (9)
The early 1990's in Rwanda, in particular, were characterized by immunity from prosecution for those who partook in
violent acts against the Tutsi minority. The government had established a political and social climate in which lawlessness
and an absolute disrespect for the value of human life prevailed. As Payam Akhavan notes, "[at] the time of the genocide
in 1994, no legal steps had been taken against those responsible for the earlier and present massacres: there was no fear of
punishment. (10)
Consequently, when the orders to kill the Tutsis were disseminated throughout the country in the days
following President Habyarimana's death (11)
none of those who joined in the slaughter had any fear that they would ever be
held accountable for their actions. When the new government took power in Rwanda following the victory of the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Army in
July 1994, it publicly committed itself to dealing with the perpetrators of genocide in a just manner and in respect to the
rule of law. In the days immediately following its victory, the new Government of National Unity had to determine how it
would administer justice to those who had been responsible for the atrocities. As justice Richard Goldstone, the first Chief
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Yugoslavia notes, a country emerging from a period of
chaos and violence has four options for dealing with those who were responsible for the violence: 1. grant a blanket immunity from prosecution for past criminal acts; 2. allow a regular justice system to operate and ordinary courts to try and sentence anyone proven guilty of criminal conduct; 3. establish a truth and reconciliation commission or its equivalent in order to enable confessions of guilt for past human rights abuses to be traded
for indemnification; or, 4. establish a modified truth commission under which the most serious offenders remain subject to... prosecution (12)
The Government of National Unity categorically rejected any possibility of granting amnesty to those who had perpetrated
the violence. While it was interested in developing innovative methods of dealing with criminals under the rule of law, it
was equally determined that Rwanda's culture of impunity would have to be stopped once and for all. The ICTR Legal experts tend to ignore the society's history, culture and traditions, including its pre-existing legal traditions. Alien legal systems are designed
(often based on the model of the donor's legal system) and imposed on the country with little or no consultation and scant knowledge of the local
...culture and history (13)
In the haste to deal with the aftermath of the genocide the United nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in the autumn of 1994, and Rwanda adopted the "Organic Law " one year later. Developed mainly by
westerners, both the Organic Law and the ICTR display little understanding of the complexities of Rwanda's society.
Based on and dedicated to a model of retributive punishment, neither forum has been able to effectively deal with the
complicated issue of what to do with those who participated in the 1994 genocide. The goals of the ICTR were to, "[bring] the perpetrators of acts of genocide to justice [and to support] national
reconstruction and reconciliation. (14)
Styled after the model of the post World War Two tribunals in Nuremburg, the ICTR
is a justice mechanism based on western concepts of criminal law. It embodies the latest in European and western legal
procedures and carries with it all of the rights and privileges accorded to those accused in western societies. It also
incorporates western forms of punishment, many of which are foreign to traditional African societies. For a variety of reasons, the government of Rwanda has been opposed to the ICTR from its very inception. The most
contentious issues between Rwanda and the ICTR revolve around the tribunal's refusal to incorporate the death penalty as a
form of punishment for the organizers and leaders of the genocide (Rwanda's Organic Law includes the death penalty),
jurisdiction, and the location of the seat of the court (15)
Procedural issues, such as the recent release of one of the primary
leaders of the genocide, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, because the tribunal was too slow in bringing him to trial after his arrest,
have led to a strong condemnation of the ICTR by Rwanda and its people and a further distrust of the tribunal (16)
The court also enjoys little respect from the people of Rwanda who see it as a foreign instrument. Most Rwandans have no
means of accessing the court. The vast majority of them are far too poor to travel to Arusha, and therefore cannot
participate in its forum. There is virtually no television in the Rwanda, and very few Rwandans have access to foreign or
unbiased media reports (17)
Consequently, the people do not get the opportunity to hear how the genocide was planned and
executed, nor do they get to see the individuals who masterminded the horrible events of 1994 being brought to justice.
Insofar as the victims of the genocide do not get the opportunity to face their abusers as individuals they continue to
collectivize the guilt of the Hutu, the result of which is a severe impediment to national reconciliation. As Payam Akhavan
notes, in order for Rwanda to move forward with reconciliation "the Tutsi must absolve the Hutu of indefinite collective
responsibility for the genocide while also having a legitimate means of vindicating their suffering through a 'collective
catharsis'. (18)
Whereas the ICTR has been fairly successful in hunting down those leaders of the genocide who fled Rwanda in 1994, and
giving notice that the world community will not permit such heinous crimes to go unpunished, but it has been very
unsuccessful in its objectives of healing or reconciling Rwanda's divided society. The Organic Law In early November 1995, the Government of National Unity, searching for solutions to its formidable internal legal
problems, convened an international conference in Kigali on "Genocide, Impunity, and Accountability. (19)
The meeting
brought together several dozen foreign legal experts, as well as leaders from Rwandan society "..[to wrestle] with the
manifold problems of prosecuting the 1994 genocide. (20)
From the Kigali conference emerged the Organic La (21)
"a
classification scheme to separate the main organizers of the genocide from criminals with lesser degrees of responsibility,
and a unique scheme [developed principally by William Schabas of the University of Quebec at Montreal] aimed at
encouraging offenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences; (22)
in essence adopting the a mixture of
the second and fourth options as outlined by Goldstone above (23)
Article two of the Organic Law creates four categories of offences as follows: Category 1: includes organizers or planners of the genocide, persons in positions of authority within the military or civilian infrastructure who
committed or encouraged genocide, ...notorious murderers who acted with great zeal...and persons who committed acts of sexual torture. Penalty-
Death. Category 2: includes individuals not in the first category who committed murder or serious crimes against the person that caused death. Penalty -
life imprisonment. Category 3: those who committed other serious assaults against the person. Penalty - as per the Rwandan penal code - 6 months to five years. Category 4: those who committed offences against property. Penalty - civil damages as agreed between the parties (24)
The key elements of the Organic Law are the procedures for confession and guilty pleas as outlined in articles 4-16; a
procedure unusual in the civil law environment in that it permits a form of plea bargaining not normally found outside of
the common law system. In return for a confession and guilty plea for an accused charged under either of the second, third
or fourth categories, there is provision for substantially reduced penalties. Category one offenders can also benefit from
reduced sentences, but only if their confessions are made prior to their names being listed in the Official Gazette (25)
In spite of the good intentions of those who drafted the Organic Law, its effectiveness was severely limited by the fact that
it is a system based on a western procedural model, a system which is optimized for dealing with small numbers of accused
at any given time. Furthermore, the confession option provides little incentive for the accused to tell the truth. Under the
Organic Law, category one offenders face the death penalty, in spite of a confession, unless they confessed before being
registered in the Official Gazette (26)
For those who had participated in the genocide but had not already been listed in the
Official Gazette, there was little incentive to confess, especially if they had not yet been indicted or arrested. Even for
those few who wished to confess, the sheer numbers of people incarcerated and awaiting trial without the benefit of habeas
corpus, plus the lack of defence counsel, made the option nearly impossible. Four years after the development of the Organic Law, some 120,000 people, crammed into severely overcrowded prisons
inside Rwanda, continue to await trial. In many cases, the incarcerated individuals still do not know the charges against
them (27)
This situation has several very serious implications for the national reconciliation process. Realizing that
approximately one percent of all Hutu males are incarcerated, many are accusing the Government of National Unity of
carrying out "victor's justice" against the Hutu population. As John Prendergast and David Smock point out, "The
impartiality of the Rwandan justice system will be key to genuine reconciliation and social development. [The] Rwandan
population needs to be convinced that the justice system is being rebuilt in an impartial manner.... (28)
This can only be
accomplished by showing the average Rwandan citizen that the justice system can function fairly and effectively. Due to
the vast numbers incarcerated, and the inability of the court system to deal with such a huge burden, there is little hope that
under the current scheme the perception of victor's justice can be overcome. Interest Versus Position The conflict resolution process, and the manner in which the [complex political emergency] is brought to a close is of critical importance both for
determining the political context that emerges and for shaping the long-term prospects of peacebuilding and the restoration of the rule of law (29)
When Rwandan Prime Minister Pasteur Bizimungu opened the Kigali Conferenc (30)
on October 31, 1995, he "...called for
innovative forms of justice while at the same time ruling out any possibility of amnesty. (31)
It was the position of the
Government of national Unity that under the terms of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (32)
to which it was a signatory, it was obligated to punish those responsible for the violence that had devastated
the country. Although Mr. Bizimungu expressed his desire to develop innovative forms of justice, in adopting the position that amnesty
was not to be considered he effectively set the tone that committed Rwanda to the establishment of a retributive criminal
justice system. It was immediately clear that "innovativeness" was to be focused on process design, not system design. In
essence, the Kigali conference was limited from its very inception to designing the procedures that Rwanda would
implement in establishing a criminal trial system, one which would impose western style procedures and punishments on
Africans, many of whom have never left their jungle villages. By stressing its position that all perpetrators must be
punished, instead of focusing on its stated interests of establishing the rule of law and bringing about national
reconciliation, the Government of Rwanda missed an opportunity to develop a truly innovative and culturally appropriate
justice system. Whereas it is clear that parties signatory to the Genocide Convention are obligated to provide effective penalties to those
found guilty of the crime of genocide, the convention does not contain sentencing provisions, nor does it stipulate the
design of the justice system to be used. The Genocide Convention reads in part: Art .4. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. Art. 5. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3. Art. 6. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction (33)
When one looks at the effectiveness thus far of both the ICTR and the Organic Law, one has to question whether the
sentencing models being used are "effective. (34)
Six years after the genocide, approximately ninety percent of those charged
or incarcerated have still not been tried. Had Rwanda focused on its interests when developing the Organic Law, it might well have adopted a completely different
system than the one currently in place. When Prime Minister Bizimungu categorically dismissed amnesty at the outset of
the Kigali conference, the delegates to the conference interpreted his position to mean that no forms of punishment found
outside of the contemporary western penal model would be considered. Thus, the door to many other forms of
punishment, including traditional African models, was closed. The result has been that Rwanda is burdened by an
ineffective justice system, and a society which has not yet come to terms with its past. Truth Commissions and Gacaca "Exposure [to] the truth enables a society to move beyond the pain and the horror of the past. (35)
It appears, as noted above, that there was an assumption that when Prime Minister Bizimungu stated that there would not
be any amnesty granted, that the idea of truth commissions for Rwanda was dismissed. The fundamental error the Kigali
Conference made in adopting this assumption was the misconception that truth commissions necessarily result in amnesty
for those who participate. As Theresa Klosterman notes, "...truth commissions serve four compelling purposes: (1)
establishing an authoritative record of events; (2) providing flexibility over formal prosecution; (3) laying a foundation for
later prosecutions; and (4) promoting national reconciliation. Truth commissions also provide tools for giving victims
catharsis and deterring further violations of human rights." (36)
In the past two decades there have been several truth
commissions established to deal with situations where there have been mass violations of human rights. While some
commissions have offered amnesty to the accused, others have not (37)
All have, however, provided "...an effective way of
ensuring that history is recorded more accurately and more faithfully than would otherwise have been the case. (38)
It is this
history which is crucial for a society emerging from a situation in which so many of its inhabitants have been subjected to
massive human rights violations. Insofar as Tutsis and Hutus continue to live together as neighbours, it is essential that they learn not only about what
happened in their communities, but which of their neighbours were or were not involved. Many of the survivors of
Rwanda's genocide do not know who organized the violence in their neighbourhoods or, in many cases, which of their
neighbours took part in the killings. Nor do they know the fate of many of their missing relatives. All of this has led to a
situation wherein there is a large amount of secrecy, distrust and fear. As Evelyn Bradley notes: A truth commission would provide the opportunity to recognize and celebrate the lives of the many Rwandans who died. The stories of the many
Hutus, some of whom died trying to save their fellow Rwandan Tutsis, must be told and recorded. There is rightly much Rwandan and international
attention to the importance of investigating the killings, naming those responsible, and bringing them to court to answer charges of mass murder.
However, it is also fundamentally important for the future of Rwanda for those who resisted the killings to be chronicled, named and celebrated. It
would [also] afford perpetrators the opportunity to confess to their crimes and seek forgiveness. Only in this context can reconciliation, in the sense
of forgiveness and the re-establishment of communities, be attempted (39)
In an effort to boost the process of national reconciliation, the Rwandan government recently adopted a new approach to
dealing with those responsible for the genocide; an approach which accords much more with the government's expressed
interests, and with Rwanda's culture. Under the leadership of Aloysie Inyumba, the National Reconciliation Commission
"...initiated consultations throughout the country on issues related to coexistence (40)
Perhaps its most innovative mandate
[was] to monitor all government programs to determine how they affect peace, reconciliation, and national unity. (41)
One of
the recommendations from the commission was that Rwanda adopt the traditional Gacac (42)
, "a form of mediation
performed by a village council of elders, ... as a method of promoting reconciliation at the communal level by promoting
justice through mediation. (43)
In March 1999, Justice Minister Jean de Dieu Mucyo announced that in January 2000, the
Gacaca system would be implemented "... to try accused people in the second and third categories of Rwanda's genocide
law. (44)
Gacaca will not be available to those who are listed as category one prisoners. They will remain in the court system
and continue to be eligible for the death sentence under the Organic Law. [The] tribunals will operate at four levels - cellule, sector, commune and prefecture...." (45)
with the aim of bringing victims
and accused face to face to tell their stories. Sentences will be decided at the completion of each Gacaca. In this manner, it
is believed that justice will be swifter and fairer. Many of those who have languished in prison for years will finally get
their day in "court" in front of a jury of their peers. It is hoped that through Gacaca the reconciliation process will be
rehabilitated and the rule of law will be restored. On its face, it appears as though the Gacaca is a solution to many of the problems in Rwanda's justice system. It may,
however, prove to have some fatal flaws. As one Western observer in Kigali points out, "... most Hutus were involved with
the genocide in some capacity. Placing a genocidaire [someone who committed genocide] in front of his community will
put the community itself through a test of innocence or guilt. (46)
Insofar as one of the effects of the current Organic Law has
been the isolation of Rwandan society into two camps (the Guilty Hutu vs the Tutsi Victim), it may be very difficult to
extract confessions out of those who were responsible. The fact that the Tutsis now control the country, and thus far have
used very brutal methods to deal with insurgents and others that they consider to be a threat, has caused a very real
(although not necessarily realistic) fear that those who do volunteer information will be severely punished once they
confess. Given the impunity that the Hutus enjoyed for decades, many are concerned that the new government will adopt
the same policies of impunity that the Habyarimana regime followed, allowing the Tutsi population to take revenge once
the perpetrators are exposed. Another possible impediment to Gacaca lies in what Mark Drumbl describes as a "sense of moral ambiguity...[and a]
"world where almost no-one feels guilty. (47)
Many of those involved in the violence of 1994 refuse to acknowledge that
there was a genocide, preferring to characterize their actions as a patriotic duty. One of the most common refrains from
those who have admitted killing their Tutsi neighbours is that they did so in the context of the war their government was
fighting against the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and that all Tutsis were the enemy. In many cases, spurred on by propaganda
from Radio Milles Collines, and by local government officials, the Hutus were brain-washed into believing that their
neighbours were part of a Tutsi conspiracy to take over the country and force Hutus into slavery. The Gacaca process will likely be presented with its most significant challenge in communities in which the majority of the
people involved in the process were also participants in the slaughter. There is a very real possibility that the rule of law
could be undermined in such communities if persons who were actually guilty are freed by their friends and relatives.
Equally harmful to the process might be a situation in which people are unjustly accused and held accountable due to a
large Tutsi population in the area. The potential for such circumstances is very high. If the Gacaca system is to work, then it must be monitored and overseen by people who are educated and trained for their
responsibilities. Thus far, the lack of qualified and non-biased arbitrators has been one of the most significant impediments
to the establishment of a Rwandan justice system. In order for the Gacaca to work effectively, both Hutu and Tutsi will
have to be convinced that under the regime that justice will be done fairly, no matter who the accused or who the victim is.
Many observers have noted that an increased number of educated and impartial Hutu arbitrators and/or foreign observers
will be key to ensuring the success of the Gacaca. Only through seeing non-Tutsis meaningfully involved in the system
will the Gacaca win the confidence and trust of those who stand accused. Only then will the truth of the genocide begin to
be told by those who carried it out. Conclusion Writing about the Rwandan genocide in 1995, Gerard prunier stated that, "The immensity of the crime cannot be dealt with
through moderate versions of European criminal law made for radically different societies. (48)
He was correct. Although the
concept of Gacaca was considered in the Kigali conference in the autumn of 1995 it was dismissed as a possibility since it
did not fit with the models of justice that were familiar to the majority of those who had gathered. The result of the Kigali
Conference was the development of an Organic Law which, as many observers noted, was bound to fail, if for no other
reason than the Rwandan justice system was completely incapable of handling such an enormous task. When Prime Minister Bizimungu dismissed the idea of amnesty, he set the tone for the development of the Organic Law.
By focusing on the aspect of punishment, the last step in the justice process, the opportunity to create a truly innovative
justice system was foreclosed before the conference even got under way. It is quite apparent that those at the Kigali Conference were of the impression that the Genocide Convention requires
"punishment" in the western meaning of the word. However, articles five and six of the convention require only that
accused persons "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction. (49)
, and that the tribunal shall "...Provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. (50)
The
Genocide Convention neither stipulates the type of punishment nor the type of justice system. All that is required is that
the tribunal shall be competent and that the penalties shall be effective. It is understandable, given international lawyers' general abhorrence for impunity, that a gathering of them to design a
legal system will incorporate the Nuremburg model of dealing with war crimes and other issues of international law.
However, it must also be kept in mind that not all societies are the same. International (and national) responses to issues
such as those in Rwanda need to be sensitive to both the differences and commonalities between various societies and their
concepts of law. In many ways, intra-societal violence is analogous to family violence. Families which have been victim
to violence do not heal simply by placing the offender(s) in jail. Just as there are numerous procedures and methods for
attempting to heal the scars of family violence, so should there be for dealing with violence within a community or nation. As Rama Mani notes, a country emerging from chaos faces three challenges: clarifying the concept of the rule of law;
recognizing the political nature of the task, and, incorporating the local population in rule of law programs (51)
The Gacaca
was rejected because it did not fit into a preconceived notion of what justice should look like. By overlooking the Gacaca
in 1995 the Rwandan government denied its people the opportunity to establish and deal with the story of the genocide
while it was till fresh and relatively undesecrated. This traditional form of cultural law had within it the tools to support
national reconciliation and to establish a permanent record of what really happened in Rwanda. Rwanda's people have had
five years to solidify their positions and reinforce in their own minds their own versions of what occurred in 1994.
Neighbours have lived together in fear of one another; one fearing retribution, the other fearing a recurrence of the past.
Many have designed ingenious methods of coping with the past and are unwilling to revisit those horrible times.
Persuading these people to come out of their shells and address the horrors of the past will be a monumental task. The challenge Rwanda faced and continues to face in the aftermath of the genocide is incredible. The fledgling
government, faced with an enormous task should be commended for bringing together experts from around the world to
help it build a new justice system out of the ashes. The fact that it lost sight of its most important goals in the process is
understandable. If anything positive can come from the last four years of the Organic Law, it should be the
acknowledgement that the western criminal law model might not be the most effective model for dealing with complex
legal problems in non-western societies, and that traditional forms of conflict resolution and truth finding might be
effective methods with which to deal with a wide variety of conflicts. Therefore, they should not be categorically
dismissed in favour of systems which are inherently foreign to the target culture. In January Rwanda will institute the Gacaca, a system that it rejected four years ago. Gacaca will likely prove to be
effective in at least some communities, especially if it gets the proper levels of support and expertise it needs in order to
function. In many communities, however, the success of Gacaca is likely to be limited, but it will at least convey the
message that the government is serious about resolving the huge problems it is facing with respect to the thousands of
people currently detained and waiting trial.. The ICTR and the Organic Law have failed Rwanda. Gacaca is likely the last chance that the government has to establish a
society in which the rule of law is seen as being supreme and "national reconciliation" is something more substantive than
the name of a government commission. To some, Gacaca may seem to be a program with very little potential. Others
regard it as a solution to Rwanda's problems and have been proponents of the process since before the Organic Law was
incorporated. In either case, it is highly likely that it will be an improvement over the system that is currently struggling to
operate in Rwanda. Even more importantly, it is probable that it will be seen by many as a government attempt to involve
the population in the justice system and as a tool which empowers the people to participate in society. It will likely not be
the perfect solution to Rwanda's problems but, as Theresa Klosterman notes, " A step toward justice may be better than no
justice at all. (52)
0. Richard Goldstone, "Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals" (Spring 1996) 28:3 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol 485 at 485-86. Sources: "ICTR Detainees-- Status on 27 April 2000", International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
online: <http://www.ictr.org> last accessed 15 May 00, and "Rwanda: Human Rights Developments 1998", Human Rights Watch, online:
<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/africa/rwanda.html> last accessed 5 Nov 1999. avoices/avspr96/avspr96.htm#Rwandans Begin Task of Bringing to Justice the Perpetrators of Genocide> last accessed 10 November 1999. Also see generally P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1998) at 303-318.